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This dissertation assesses the effects of Quantitative Easing (QE) on the investment 
portfolios of the Pension Funds (PF) and the plausibility of the portfolio balance channel 
for the context of the Eurozone. We used a log-log econometric model and panel data to 
answer the questions 1) How did QE affect the investment portfolios of PFs; 2) If these 
changes are expected by the portfolio balance channel; 3) Are the effects consistent when 
we take into consideration countries with higher asset holdings by pension funds?  
Our results suggests that QE had a positive effect on the stock of both corporate bonds 
and government bonds as well as cash and deposits. The increase in corporate bonds 
appear to be higher than that of private bonds so this seems to be in line with the 
hypothesis, since the relative amount of government bonds decreased. The results for 
bigger PF are not statistically significative for most cases. 
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QUANTITATIVE EASING IN THE EUROZONE: PORTFOLIO BALANCE  CHANNEL 
AND PENSION FUNDS 
By Mario Franganito 
  
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation assesses the effects of Quantitative Easing (QE) on the investment 
portfolios of the Pension Funds (PF) and the plausibility of the portfolio balance channel 
for the context of the Eurozone. We used a log-log econometric model and panel data to 
answer the questions 1) How did QE affect the investment portfolios of PFs; 2) If these 
changes are expected by the portfolio balance channel; 3) Are the effects consistent when 
we take into consideration countries with higher asset holdings by pension funds?  
Our results suggests that QE had a positive effect on the stock of both corporate bonds 
and government bonds as well as cash and deposits. The increase in corporate bonds 
appear to be higher than that of private bonds so this seems to be in line with the 
hypothesis, since the relative amount of government bonds decreased. The results for 
bigger PF are not statistically significative for most cases. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic brought not only a colossal public health crisis but also an 
equally devastating economic crisis, that we are only now begging to understand its full 
extent. Unlike in the 2008 economic crisis, central banks were much quicker to act this 
time around to supress the economic downturn. Such measures have ranged from 
lowering interest rates, to emergency credit lines, to new Quantitative Easing (QE) 




programmes. For instance, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) envelope for the 
pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) is (as of September 2020) €1,350 
billion, among a series of other measures to ease the effects of the pandemic. Similarly, 
the Bank of England announced a new QE program of £300 billion and the FED declared 
– after lowering their interest rates to 0 – it would buy $80 billion a month in Treasuries 
and $40 billion in residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities until further 
notice.  
In the short run, these measures have a huge impact on the public debt of the countries 
and the balance sheet of their respective central banks. For instance, the Office for 
National Statistics announced in July 2020 that the UK’s public debt reached a record 
£2,004.0 billion, as a result of the expansionary fiscal policy – £227.6 billion more than 
at the same point last year – which translates to around 100.5% of its GDP. On the other 
hand, a quick analysis of the FED’s balance sheet shows that their total assets skyrocketed 
from roughly $4 trillion in the beginning of 2020 to approximately $7 trillion, as of 
September 2020. An increase of 75%, as a result of the large-scale purchase programmes.  
The goal of QE is to lower the interest rates on government bonds. To do so, CBs 
carry out large-scale purchases of these titles which increases their prices in the secondary 
market and thus decrease their internal interest rates. This allows the government to issue 
new debt titles at lower interest rates, which in turn stimulates public spending.  
The BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee emphasised the role of the so-called portfolio 
balance channel as a key element in the transmission mechanism of the asset purchases 
to the rest of the economy. According to this mechanism, the purchase of treasuries by 
the central bank increases liquidity, leading investors to buy riskier assets, pushing their 
prices up. On the other hand, the lower interest rates reduce borrowing costs for 




households and companies, also stimulating expenditure. Given that Pension Funds (PF) 
and insurance companies hold a significant amount of debt securities issued in the EU, 
the question of how QE affected their investment portfolios arises. 
To assess how QE has affected the investment portfolios of PF and if the portfolio 
balance channel holds true for the context of the Eurozone, we used a log-log econometric 
model resorting to panel data from the eurozone countries across a time period of 18 years 
(from 2000 to 2018). 
Our research shows that there is statistical evidence that supports the hypothesis of 
the portfolio balance channel for PF in the context of the Eurozone. 
In chapter 2 we consider the theorical framework of the topic at hand, its relevance 
and the approach followed to test the hypothesis. In chapter 3 we discuss the data used 
and the econometric model. In chapter 4 we present the results and debate their 
reasonableness and implications. Finally, in chapter 5, we conclude the dissertation by 
summarizing the results. 
 
2. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
CB generally have two main objectives, price stability and the stability of the financial 
system. To achieve this, CBs set their interest rates so that they can increase or decrease 
the aggregated demand and thereby, affect the economy (see, for instance, Fawley and 
Neely, 2013). More recently this tool has become less effective since, in most advanced 
economies, interest rates have approached or reached the zero lower bound (ZLB). This 
was particularly evident after the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, the main interest rate 
of the ECB has been lower than 1% since 2012 and for the BoE and the FED this is true 
since 2009. 




Given the extent of the Great Recession combined with the ZLB, CB had to resort to 
the so-called unconventional monetary policy. Unconventional monetary policy is often 
defined as measures other than interest rate setting, adopted by CB to affect the economy. 
Such measures include alterations of the composition of the CB balance sheet (normally 
referred to as qualitative easing), large-scale asset purchases (commonly known as QE) 
and forward policy guiding (see, for instance, the reflections conducted on the different 
dimensions along which unconventional policy measures can be classified in Bernanke, 
Reinhart and Sack, 2004, and Meier, 2009, among others).  
QE seeks to increase the liquidity of the economy. This is accomplished by large scale 
purchases of assets through open market operations, which are financed by electronically 
crediting banks reserve accounts in the CB. Monetary policy makers have often 
emphasized the role of the portfolio balance channel (see, for instance Bernanke, 2010 
and Yellen, 2011, for the U.S and Bean, 2011, for the UK). We discuss such mechanisms 
in greater detail in section 2.1. 
QE was first used in Japan in the early 2000s to combat their domestic deflation, after 
their interest rates reached the ZLB in 1999. This programme caused the reserves of the 
Bank of Japan to increase 5-fold, from 5 trillion yens to 25 trillion yens, with mixed 
results (see Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013). Since then, quantitative and qualitative 
easing programs have occurred frequently in Japan and the world. More recently QE 
programmes have been used to counter the negative effects of the Great Recession and 
again during the 2020 pandemic. 
Despite its increase in use, QE faces plenty of criticism. The negative effects on 
inequality (see, for instance, Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou, 2017, and Alves and Silva, 




2020), the agency problem created between CB and government1, the reluctancy on 
ending such programmes (for both cases, see Fisher, 2010) and the unfounded2 claims of 
hyperinflation, are some of the most discussed topics. 
 
2.1. Transmission mechanisms 
There are a number of ways in which QE is believed to affect the real economy. 
Benford et al. (2009) and Joyce, Tong, and Woods (2011), among others, discuss in great 
detail how the mechanisms are thought to work and the importance of the liquidity in the 
economy created by the asset purchases. Here we only present the three main 
mechanisms: 
1) The portfolio balance channel – Often associated with the work of Tobin (1958), 
which argues that when there’s imperfect substitutability between financial assets, 
changes in asset supplies lead to changes in financial asset prices. So, when the 
CB buys assets, their price increases which leads to a correspondingly lower yield. 
This decreases the cost of borrowing which incentivises governments to spend 
and invest more (i.e., robust fiscal policies) as well as households and companies. 
Further, higher asset prices increase the wealth of asset holders, which boosts their 
spending.  
Investors that sold assets to the CB will have to choose between retaining the extra 
money or buying new riskier assets. If they do not consider the new extra money 
to be a perfect substitute for the assets sold, they will choose to buy new riskier 
 
1 The agency problem results from the fact that, while QE programmes are undergoing, governments have 
incentives to spend more due to the artificially low interest rates, thus, become less bounded to market 
discipline which creates incentives to maintain these programmes indefinitely.  
2 (McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014) argue that new money is predominantly created by commercial banks 
and that new reserves do not translate to new loans, due to the constraint faced by the demand of new loans. 




assets (such as corporate bonds) to rebalance their portfolio and thus drive up the 
prices of other assets. The second seller faces the same dilemma as the first, thus 
forming a cycle. Equilibrium is reached when investors are willing to hold the 
overall supplies of assets and money. When this happens asset prices as a whole 
are expected to have increased. 
Higher asset prices also stimulate spending by increasing the wealth of asset 
holders3. 
2) Liquidity premia – Liquidity premium is the additional value investors demand 
for an asset that cannot be easily sold for its market value. When markets are 
dysfunctional, the number of transactions slows and assets become less liquid, so 
buyers ask for premiums, thereby decreasing prices in the market. When CB buy 
assets from the market, it is directly increasing liquidity to the asset holders but 
also encouraging trading since sellers will likely buy new assets to rebalance their 
portfolios. The increase in transactions, decreases the liquidity premium, thus 
increasing the prices. This effect may only persist while the CB is conducting asset 
purchases. 
3) Expectations – As seen by the “whatever it takes” speech of former ECB 
president Mario Draghi – may play as much of a role in the economy as actions 
themselves. If market players expect QE to have real effects on inflation, the 
inflation goal of the monetary authority becomes credible. If expectations of 
inflation are credible then they will play a role in salary negotiations and thus costs 
 
3 The wealth effect is a behavioural economic theory that states that an increase in wealth increases spending 
due to a sense of financial security. This effect is not as strong as an income effect, since people tend to 
prefer a smooth path of consumption, thus, an increase in wealth is distributed over time and its effect in 
consumption dissipated. 




of production. This means that prices will increase due to increases in costs and 
an aggregated demand increase. 
The markets interpreted Mr Mario Draghi’s speech as credible, thus, expected the 
actions of the ECB to be effective, which caused their inflation expectations to be 
anchored to the target. 
In figure 1 we can see a stylised representation of the effects aforementioned for the 
British economy. A similar process is thought to play in the eurozone. The general idea 
is that by buying assets, CBs increase asset prices, decrease the long-term yield, thus 
boosting aggregated demand, thereby increasing inflation. 
 
Figure 1 – QE Transmission channels 
Source: Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011), pp. 93 
 
Authors such as Woodford (2012) dispute the claims of the portfolio balance channel 
on the basis that such mechanism does not hold true for a modern, general-equilibrium 
theory of asset prices. He argues that, under such circumstances, assets are thought to be 
valued for their state-contingent payoffs and investors should be able to correctly 
anticipate the consequences portfolio choices today, have on their future wealth, to the 
extent that financial markets are effectively frictionless. Furthermore, Eggertsson and 




Woodford (2003) find that, under the context of a representative-household model, asset 
purchases by central banks through open-market operations have no impact on asset 
prices, no matter the asset bought. The authors argue that when CB assume the real-state 
risk onto their own balance sheet, this does not mean that it disappears from the economy, 
since, in the scenario of a default, CB will have lower earnings, which then translates to 
lower earnings distributed to the treasury and thus, higher taxes. In the end, the after-tax 
income will be just as dependant on the real-state risk as it was before. 
 
2.2 Pension funds’ portfolio allocation 
A PF’s final goal is to save the contributions made by workers during their working 
life and pay them pensions when they retire. Since workers have little incentives to 
withdrawal their funds while still active – because doing so implies paying huge 
premiums in the form of taxes – this means that pension funds face most of their liabilities, 
on average, after the average retirement age of their pensioners. To be able to face their 
liabilities, PFs must do asset-liability matching, that is, match their future asset sales and 
income streams to their future expenses (i.e., pensions). Another important factor that 
influences portfolio allocation by pension funds is legislation and regulation4. PF must 
also encompass the risk preferences of all their stakeholders (asset managers, trustees, 
and pensioners), which each have their own interests. Furthermore, these allocations are 
not static and might suffer alterations in the short-term to take advantage of changes in 
the market (see Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado, 1997).  
 
4 Examples of this range from accounting standards such as the FRS 17 or the IAS19, to regulation 
2019/1238, that regulates the pan-European Personal Pension Products (PEPP) and may enforce some type 
of liquidity requirement (such as a determined percentage of cash) or even restrictions related to holding 
junk level assets. See Amir, Guan and Oswald (2010) for further details on how legislation may influence 
portfolio allocation for PFs. 




Another important aspect that affects portfolio allocation is the size of the pension 
funds. Larger pension funds tend to be actively managed in contrast with smaller pension 
funds, that tend to be passively managed, due to the fixed cost often associated with this 
practice. The size of pension funds is directly related to the different methods of funding 
retirement plans, that are practiced in each country. Commonly, there are 3 pillars of 
pension funds provision: 1) A state run pension scheme that provides a basic income; 2) 
An occupational pension plan that accepts contributions by individuals and employers; 3) 
Private savings plans (including savings accounts). The relative importance of each of 
these pillars will then shape the size of pension funds. Countries like Portugal rely heavily 
on pillar 1, thus, pension funds are few and small. On the other hand, countries like 
Netherlands rely more heavily on pillars 2 and 3, which create room for these institutions 
to flourish. We would expect that the effects of QE would be stronger in countries whose 
pension plans tend to lean on pillar number 2 and therefore create bigger pension funds 
that tend to be managed actively.  
 
2.3. ECB and the Asset Purchase Program 
The approaches followed by the BoE and the ECB are different – perhaps due to the 
nature of their underlying economies. When the BoE first introduced its large-scale asset 
purchase program, its main take was that institutional investors (pension funds and 
insurance companies) would have a detrimental role in the transmission mechanism of 
QE (Fisher and Paul, 2010)5. Hence why they targeted specific long-term gilts with 
 
5 As Fisher explains in his speech: “That “portfolio rebalancing” [of the non-bank sector] channel is thought 
to have been largely absent in Japan, where most of the Japanese government bonds purchased were held 
by the banks, which in turn used the proceeds to directly de-leverage without obviously increasing the 
demand for other assets (although the purchases may have had an impact through other channels).” 




residual maturities ranging from 5 to 25 years, typically held by these investors (see 
Joyce, Liu, and Tonks, 2014). Their reasoning was that, if the asset purchases were aimed 
at banks, these would simply de-leverage themselves without increasing the demand for 
other assets. What they believe to have happened in Japan. 
In 2009 the ECB launched its first large-scale asset purchase programme, the Covered 
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) which was terminated, as expected, in 2010 when it 
totalled €60 billion. Since then, other programmes, under the umbrella of the Asset 
Purchase Programme (APP), were launched (and terminated).  
In Table 1 we can see a breakdown of the current asset holdings by ongoing 
programmes. The PSPP is by far the most significant programme totalling around 80% 
of the current holdings. The CBPP3 and the CSPP trail behind with similar holdings and 
finally there is the ABSPP, which accounts for only 1% of the holdings. 
 
Table 1 – Breakdown of current holdings by APP from the ECB 
 Holdings in millions of euros  
Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) 236,349 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) 2,290,140 
Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) 29,112 
Third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) 286,852 
Source: ECB (2020) 
 
In graph 1, we have the cumulative net purchases by programme. We can observe a 
sharp increase between 2015 and 2018, and subsequent stagnation between the years of 
2018, and 2020. In 2020 there is another increase caused by the measures taken to mitigate 




the effects of the pandemic. As of the end of October 2020, the stock of Eurosystem APP 
bonds stood at €2,999 billion. 
 
Figure 1 – APP cumulative net purchases, by programme 
Source: ECB (2020) 
 
Given the emphasis that the portfolio balance channel was given by the BoE, our goal 
is to assess whether this mechanism holds true for the context of the Eurozone. For this 
reason, we want to understand 1) How did QE affect the investment portfolios of PF; 2) 
If these changes are expected under the portfolio balance channel hypothesis; 3) If the 
effects are consistent when we take into consideration countries with higher asset 
holdings by pension funds. 




3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In order to assess if the hypothesis of the portfolio balance channel holds true for the 
context of the Eurozone and answer the questions aforementioned, we will use a similar 
approach to that of Pesaran and Smith (2014) and Pesaran and Smith (2016) – and used 
by Joyce, Liu and Tonks (2017). They argue that to identify policy effects, a conditional 
model with parameters that are invariant to the policy being studied, is sufficient. This 
means that, under the assumption of rational expectations, a fully structural DSGE model 
is not necessary. Instead, what is needed is a model with parameters invariant to the policy 
being studied (in this case, QE). With this in mind we have estimated the following 
regression model: 
Asse𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α + β. PSPP𝑖,𝑡−1 + γ. sprea𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ. deb𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + η. vi𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 +
ζ. GDPp𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + ε𝑡                                       (1) 
The dependent variable, Asse𝑡𝑖,𝑡, represents the logarithm of each asset type in 
country i in year 𝑡. We chose to use bonds – divided between corporate bonds and 
government bonds – equity, and cash and deposits, since these are the most representative 
types of assets held by pension funds. We also used the total stock of investment assets 
held by PFs to understand how QE affected their total investment decisions. PSP𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, 
represents the logarithm of the purchases of securities under the PSPP (measured in € 
millions and taken directly from the ECB) during the period of 2015-2018, lagged one 
period. As control variables, we have  sprea𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1, which represents the difference 
between the long-term real interest rates of German government debt and country 𝑖 (both 
taken from the AMECO database), measured in % and lagged one period;  deb𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1, 
which represent the deb-to-GDP ratio in country 𝑖, measured in %  and taken from OECD 




database, lagged one period; GDPp𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1, that is, the logarithm of the GDPpc measured 
in € thousands, lagged one period and taken from the AMECO database; vi𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, is an 
index that measures the expected volatility of the S&P 500, and often used as a proxy of 
the market volatility, also and lagged one year. The S&P 500 Low Volatility Index6 was 
taken from the S&P Global and we used the value from the first trading day each year. 
Our model is constructed resorting to panel data techniques. The equation is estimated 
using the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method, since it tends to estimate coefficients 
with higher efficiency than when such regressions are estimated through the classical 
OLS. Moreover, the higher efficiency arises from the fact that GLS allows some 
correlation between the residuals of the aforementioned equation. Additionally, we ran 
Hausman tests to identify whether or not we had to employ a fixed effects estimation.  
To account for the different types of pension provision policy in the eurozone, their 
effect on PF size and consequent effect on the type of portfolio management (active vs 
passive), we decided to run equation (1) for the subset of 6 countries where pension funds 
had, on average, the biggest stock of investment assets over the period studied. These 
countries are Netherlands with €800,000 million, Germany with €139,000 million, 
Finland with €104,000 million, Spain with €80,000 million, Ireland with €79,000 million 
and Italy with €73,000 million. 
We tried to use other variables that track market conditions such as the yearly return 
of the S&P 500 or the 10-year treasury yields of the USA, but these brought issues related 
to collinearity and had almost no explanation power in our model, so we decided to drop 
them. Other variables that can influence asset allocation decisions, such as regulation, are 
 
6 This index dates to April 2011, however, earlier readings are based upon the same methodology used on 
the launch day. 




extremely difficult to account for since the implementation of these measures take a long 
time to apply and the behaviour of the investors might change in advance, so we decided 
to not model their effect. 
We have gathered data for 16 of the 19 member states of the Eurozone7 for a period 
ranging between 2000 and 2018. This data has been treated with panel data techniques 
following the remarks of Park (2011). 
In table 2 you can find the basic descriptive statistics for each of the variables 
previously mentioned. 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the variables used for our database. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Median Skewness Kurtosis Obs. 
invest 92973.32 218116.40 1360152.00 0.00 16283.53 3.90 18.82 273 
cash 3161.70 6138.05 44524.00 0.00 1163.18 4.01 22.14 237 
public 25901.30 60397.46 377439.00 0.00 3374.17 3.81 19.52 168 
private 16881.14 41215.96 242745.00 0.00 2006.76 3.65 17.23 164 
equity 23860.84 66173.76 430157.00 0.00 1375.77 4.03 20.02 240 
PSPP 30302.08 46060.71 188321.00 -58.00 7887.00 1.80 5.24 64 
debt 67.92 37.05 156.85 6.65 66.11 0.33 2.29 304 
vix 11489.56 3651.35 17938.48 6855.39 11210.00 0.30 1.84 144 
GDPpc 27.64 17.39 98.64 2.90 26.66 1.54 6.38 304 
spread 0.00 3.36 23.11 -14.73 0.00 1.17 13.58 292 
Note: invest represent total investment assets held by PFs; cash represents the stocks of cash and deposits 
held by PFs; public represents the stock of government bonds PFs hold; private represents the stock of 
corporate bonds held by PFs; equity represents the total amount of stocks PFs hold.  
 
7 We chose to exclude Cyprus and Malta due to insufficient data and their materiality in respect of the total 
PSPP. Greece was not part of the PSPP programme. 





In this section, we present and discuss the results obtained by regressing equation 
(1) on different types of assets commonly held by pension funds. As previously 
mentioned, our results include a split that consists of the 6 biggest countries by PF asset 
holdings during the period of analysis. In theory, we would expect that the effects 
predicted by the portfolio balance channel are stronger in these cases since their portfolio 
management would be more active. 
In table 3 we can see the results of our regression for corporate bonds. Here we 
assess how asset purchases affected the stock of corporate bonds held by PF during the 
period between 2000 and 2018, for the population as a whole and for the 6 countries with 
the highest asset holdings by PFs. PSPP is statistically significant at the level of 1% when 
we take into consideration all the countries and use all the control variables. Furthermore, 
on average, other things equal, a 1% change in asset purchases by the ECB is associated 
with a 0.194% change in the stock of corporate bonds held by PFs in the Eurozone. This 
result is line with the expected outcome of QE, since it shows that it influences positively 
the amount of corporate bonds PF bought over the period in which PSPP is being studied. 
Other control variables such as the spread, debt and GDPpc have a positive effect on this 
outcome and are also statistically significant. For instance, GDPpc has the biggest effect 
(1.13%) and is in line with economic theory since an increase in GDPpc is a good proxy 
of a positive economic outlook which positively affects investment decision in the 
economy.  For the case of countries with the biggest pension fund holdings, we have no 









Table 3 – Regression results for the stock of corporate bonds (private) held by PF, 2000-2018. 
 All countries Subset of countries w/ large pension funds 
 GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-FE 
spread -0.028 -0.130*** -0.013 -0.114*** -0.058 0.339 0.099** 0.070 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.055) (0.416) (0.038) (0.096) 
debt 0.006 0.014** 0.000 0.018*** 0.006 -0.006 -0.019*** -0.014 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018) 
GDPpc 2.603*** 0.822  1.132** 2.498*** 3.589***  -0.558 
 (0.399) (0.581)  (0.520) (0.868) (1.356)  (3.446) 
PSPP  0.163***  0.194***  -1.015*  0.246 
  (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.573)  (0.189) 
vix   0.000*** 0.000   0.000*** 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.552 2.380 6.251*** 0.284 1.306 9.779 10.113*** 11.140 
 (1.367) (2.844) (0.765) (2.573) (3.026) (9.800) (0.217) (12.583) 
Observations 162 35 88 35 54 10 25 10 
R-squared 0.223 0.667 0.274 0.652 0.167 0.420 0.836 0.941 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In table 4 we can observe the results for government bonds. In this case, the PSPP 
is statistically significative for countries where pension funds present higher asset 
holdings, and the coefficient is negative. This is coherent with the hypothesis of the 
portfolio balance channel, that predicts that PF will sell their government bonds to the CB 
– in this case the ECB – and buy riskier assets such as corporate bonds. On average, all 
other things the same, an increase of 1% in asset purchases by the ECB is associated with 
a decrease of the stock of governments bonds held by PF funds of approximately 0.18%. 
This result is very similar to that of Joyce, Liu, and Tonks (2017). They estimated that for 
every £1 of gilts purchased by the Bank, ICPFs reduced their net inflows into government 
bonds by £0.12. 




The control variables used also feature interesting results. Spread has a negative 
effect on the stock of government bonds. The reasoning for this could be that other things 
equal, the increase in profit associated with an increase of the spread (i.e., an increase in 
risk), is not satisfactory enough for PF to buy this asset. The most significant effect 
appears to be that of GDPpc, which has a coefficient of -3.17%. This result is consistent 
with economic theory since an increase of GDPpc is associated with economic prosperity 
and bonds are a financial product more sought-after during periods of crisis, due to their 
relatively lower risk when compared with other assets such as equity.  
When we take into consideration all the countries in our data, the PSPP coefficient 
is not negative. However, it is lower than the coefficient for private bonds, which means 
that, even though our data shows that the PSPP increased the stock of public bonds held 
by PFs, the effect was not as strong as it was for the case of corporate bonds so, as a result, 
the relative percentage of public bonds held decreased, which is also in line with the 
portfolio balance channel hypothesis. 
 
  




Table 4 – Regression results for the stock of government bonds (public) held by PF, 2000-2018. 
 All countries Subset of countries w/ large pension funds 
 
GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-FE 
spread 0.110** -0.091*** 0.011 -0.079*** 0.074** 0.045 0.071 0.031 
 
(0.049) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036) (0.214) (0.076) (0.030) 
debt 0.001 -0.024** 0.010*** -0.022** 0.000 -0.013** -0.026*** -0.027** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDPpc 3.523*** -3.166*** 
 



































Constant -3.530** 19.590*** 6.591*** 19.006*** 4.305** -0.610 12.466*** 15.154* 
 
(1.735) (3.997) (0.710) (4.025) (1.954) (5.036) (0.430) (3.978) 
         
Observations 168 35 88 35 54 10 25 10 
R-squared 0.271 0.952 0.240 0.955 0.474 0.946 0.479 0.999 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 In table 5 we can observe the results of the model, now for the case of stocks. The 
results for this regression, when we look at the entire population, are not as statistically 
significant as they are for the previous asset types, however, we can see that for both 
cases, there’s statistical evidence that suggest that asset purchases had a negative effect 
on the stock of equity assets. Equity is often less attractive for pension funds since it is 
riskier in case of solvency and do not provide cyclical dividends8, that are important to 
pay current liabilities such as ongoing pensions or expenses related to running the fund9. 
Other effects vary largely if we consider all the countries or just the subset with bigger 
 
8 Stocks may pay dividends, but it’s not mandatory.  
9 Such expenses often range between actuary fees, legal fees, and consultancy fees. 




PF asset holdings and are not very statistically significant (see GDPpc) or have a small 
impact (see debt-to-GDP ratio and spread). 
 
Table 5 – Regression results for the stock of equity (equity) held by PF, 2000-2018 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In table 6, our results are for the case of cash and deposits. When we use all the 
data, the PSPP is statistically significant at the level of 1% and, on average, all other 
things being equal, a 1% increase in the asset purchases is associated with a 0.16% 
increase in the stock of cash and deposits. As expected, PSPP increases liquidity for the 
PF, but not by much, since the coefficient for GDPpc is substantially bigger and equally 
statistically significant. The debt-to-GDP ratio appears to have a negative effect on the 
holdings of these assets, but its effect is almost negligible. When running the regression 
 All countries Subset of countries w/ large pension funds 
 GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE 
spread -0.028 0.002 -0.015 0.012 0.000 0.066 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.055) (0.036) (0.473) 
debt 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.026* 0.005 -0.067*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.025) 
GDPpc 0.765*** 0.638***  0.707*** 1.374*** 2.782  -6.775* 
 (0.289) (0.158)  (0.148) (0.373) (2.821)  (3.563) 
PSPP  -0.209***  -0.121*  -0.198**  -1.626*** 
  (0.055)  (0.063)  (0.091)  (0.612) 
vix   0.000*** 0.000**   0.000*** -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 3.362*** 5.803*** 5.021*** 3.719** 2.241* -2.781 6.092*** 58.466*** 
 (0.917) (1.190) (1.044) (1.448) (1.275) (12.189) (0.327) (19.204) 
Observations 232 44 110 44 102 20 50 20 
R-squared 0.148 0.589 0.290 0.667 0.331 0.725 0.448 0.004 




only for countries with big pension funds, the effect of the PSPP is not statistically 
significative, however, the effects of the debt-to-GDP ratio maintain both the significance 
and sign – when we don’t take into consideration the control variable vix. 
 
Table 6 – Regression results for the stock of cash and deposits assets (cash) held by PF in the Eurozone, 
2000-2018. 
 All countries Subset of countries w/ large pension funds 
 GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-RE 
spread 0.037 -0.031 0.016 -0.040 0.015 0.047 -0.051* -0.136 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) (0.037) (0.027) (0.313) 
debt 0.012** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.012*** 0.005* -0.003 -0.000 -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.016) 
GDPpc 2.423*** 0.915***  0.865*** 2.144*** -0.595  -3.356 
 (0.354) (0.144)  (0.141) (0.364) (1.894)  (2.356) 
PSPP  0.218***  0.157***  0.273***  -0.346 
  (0.051)  (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.404) 
vix   0.000*** -0.000*   -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.931* 3.354*** 7.153*** 4.813*** -0.218 7.094 7.748*** 28.834** 
 (1.151) (0.935) (0.574) (1.250) (1.247) (8.183) (0.244) (12.696) 
         
Observations 237 45 116 45 99 20 50 20 
R-squared 0.237 0.743 0.125 0.798 0.373 0.788 0.097 0.236 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Finally, in table 7 we have the results of the regression in respect of the stock of 
investment assets. Again, our data shows statistical significance for the PSPP and its 
effect is positive. The control variables GDPpc and debt-to-GDP ratio have positive 
effects, are statistically significant and are in line with economic theory, since, as per table 
3, these variables are often proxies of a positive a positive economic outlook which 
positively influences investors decisions. For the case of countries with big pension funds, 




 PSPP is not statistically significant. The variable debt-to-GDP ratio appears to 
have a negative effect on the stock of investment for PFs. The debt-to-GDP ratio, up to a 
certain threshold – literature tends to agree on around 90% – positively affects economic 
growth. After this threshold, increasing this ratio hinders economics growth, which is 
consistent with the obtained coefficient for debt (see Herndon, Ash and Pollin, 2014).  
 
 
Table 7 – Regression results for the stock of investment assets (invest) held by PF in the Eurozone, 
2000-2018. 
 All countries Subset of countries w/ large pension funds 
 
GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-RE GLS-RE 
spread1 0.030 -0.021* 0.001 -0.023* 0.041** 0.002 -0.027 -0.261 
  (0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.284) 
debt1 0.022*** -0.012*** 0.001 -0.012*** 0.006*** -0.007* 0.002 -0.064*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.015) 
GDPpc1 2.158*** 0.384***   0.370*** 1.692*** -0.413   -3.447 
  (0.376) (0.059)   (0.058) (0.288) (0.732)   (2.138) 
PSPP1   0.243***   0.225***   0.273***   -0.125 
    (0.020)   (0.024)   (0.022)   (0.367) 
vix1     0.000*** -0.000     0.000** 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.842 7.634*** 9.139*** 8.067*** 3.753*** 9.895** 9.923*** 29.680*** 
  (1.176) (0.584) (0.555) (0.682) (0.983) (3.139) (0.809) (11.520) 
Observations 263 48 124 48 110 20 50 20 
R-squared 0.276 0.890 0.358 0.896 0.468 0.962 0.251 0.006 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
With these results we can answer the questions asked earlier, namely, how QE affected 
the investment portfolios of PFs. QE appears to have a positive effect on the holdings of 
corporate bonds, government bonds and cash and deposits, and a negative effect on the 




holdings of equity asset - when analyzing the entire population; Moreover, we have asked 
if these changes in line with the hypothesis of the portfolio balance channel. In fact, our 
findings suggest that this mechanism is true for the context of the Eurozone, despite 
having a positive effect on the amount government bonds, this effect appears to be weaker 
than that of corporate bonds, so the relative amount of government bonds increases. 
Lastly, we proposed to analyze the effects for the countries with higher asset holdings by 
PF. The overall results do not have statistical significance for most assets, however, we 
found that the asset purchases had a negative effect on the stock of government bonds, as 




The LZB has been a problem faced by many developed countries over the past decade. 
To mitigate the negative effects of the Great Recession and more recently the covid-19 
pandemic, CB had to resort to unconventional monetary policy, namely QE. One of the 
most important mechanisms of QE is the portfolio balance channel that occurs 
predominantly in non-banking institutions such as PF and insurance companies. The 
literature suggests that this effect has occurred in the UK but was absent in Japan. To 
understand if this hypothesis holds true for the context of the Eurozone, we decided to 
use an econometric GLS regression based on panel data for a group of 16 of the 19 
countries that are part of this group, over a period of 18 years. 
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of the portfolio balance channel for PFs 
within the Eurozone. When analysing the entire population, PSPP is statistically 
significant for most cases, and with an expected sign. When analysing the subset of 




countries where pension funds hold a bigger amount of investment assets, we do not find 
statistical significance for PSPP except for the regression in respect of government bonds. 
Here we can see that the effect is negative, which is in line with the results presented by 
Joyce, Liu and Tonks (2017) and supports the portfolio balance channel.  
 Our results suggest that, on average, all other things the same, an increase of 1% 
in PSPP leads to a 0.19% increase in the stock of corporate bonds held by PF. This is once 
again predicted by the model, since pension funds with the added liquidity, are expected 
to buy riskier assets such as corporate bonds. 
 For the case of equity assets, our results suggest a negative effect as a result of the 
asset purchases. Despite not being predicted by the model, these numbers might suggest 
a relocation to other forms of assets, such as corporate bonds. There’s statistical evidence 
that suggests an increase in the stock of cash and deposits as a result of the asset purchases, 
which translates to an increase in liquidity, an important mechanism as explained by 
Benford et al (2009).  
 In this dissertation we have studied the hypothesis of portfolio allocation for the 
case of pension funds. However, other non-banking institutions such as insurance 
companies and hedge funds may also play a relevant role in the dissemination of the asset 
purchases throughout the economy, so future research on these institutions could be 
relevant to better understand such mechanism. 
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